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Business	of	war:	contractors	acted	as	the	hidden
wiring	of	the	British	army	in	the	1700s
Today	we	are	accustomed	to	hearing	of	defence	contractors	playing	a	vital	non-combatant	role	in	warfare.	While
residual	suspicions	of	fraud	and	corruption	are	often	raised	in	areas	where	public	service	sits	uneasily	alongside
private	business	interests,	we	now	like	to	think	that	stricter	regulation	ensures	greater	transparency,	accountability,
and	economy.	It	was	not	always	thus.	In	the	eighteenth	century,	contractors	had	a	bad	reputation	for	rapaciousness
and	profiteering.	In	fact,	this	association	was	far	older.	In	Shakespeare’s	Henry	V,	Pistol	boasts	“For	I	shall	sutler
[trader]	be,	Unto	the	camp,	and	profits	will	accrue”.
While	the	business	ethics	of	military	contracting	is	not	my	main	focus,	this	type	of	critique	has	featured	prominently	in
discussions	of	contractors.	The	great	historian	of	eighteenth-century	politics,	Sir	Lewis	Namier,	placed	great
emphasis	on	patronage,	clientage,	and	cronyism	in	awarding	contracts	and	appointing	officials.	Indeed,	until	recently
we	might	have	been	forgiven	for	not	understanding	what	contractors	actually	did—most	pertinently	what	they	did	in
the	economic	life	of	the	country,	for	contractors	were	the	greatest	‘middlemen’	of	the	eighteenth	century,	and	as	such
occupied	a	central	position	supplying	the	largest	organisations	of	that	century:	military	forces.	In	a	recent	article,	I
found	contracting	to	be	an	extensive,	diverse,	and	complex	activity.
In	contrast	to	European	armies,	the	British	army	laboured	under	constitutional	and	institutional	limitations,	often
making	its	procedures	and	operations	laborious,	makeshift,	irregular,	and	informal.	Parliamentary	control	of	army
finance	after	1688	and	the	absence	of	a	permanent	supply	organisation	were	problematic	when	the	British
government	sought	to	raise	a	large	army	to	combat	larger	European	standing	armies.	The	government	supply
apparatus	was	sparse,	with	great	reliance	placed	on	various	traditional	haphazard	methods	such	as	local
requisitioning	and	foraging.
To	fill	the	gap	in	the	supply	system,	a	cohort	of	private	contractors	emerged	between	1739	and	1770,	who	quickly
assumed	a	vital	role	in	supply	matters.	Recent	work	on	naval	contractors	has	usefully	coined	the	term	‘the	Contractor
State’,	an	overdue	recognition	of	contractors’	importance	to	a	highly-effective	public-private	partnership.	The	success
of	contracting	was	based	on	market	knowledge	and	accessibility,	resource	procurement	and	allocation,	and
organisational	and	administrative	capacity	which	bureaucrats	would	have	found	difficult	to	organise.	Moreover,
government	could	use	mercantile	expertise	without	having	to	capitalise	its	structures	and	operations,	as	would	have
occurred	if	a	supply	corps	had	existed.
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There	were	other	excellent,	rational	economic	reasons	for	using	contractors.	Adaptability	and	flexibility	were	vital,
particularly	given	the	transition	from	peace	to	war	and	vice	versa.	In	Britain,	peace-time	establishments	were	low	but
in	an	era	of	large	standing	armies,	mobilisation	to	a	wartime	establishment,	was	all	the	greater.	As	government
needed	to	move	rapidly,	contractors	provided	them	with	an	efficient	mechanism	for	achieving	this	transition	smoothly.
Contractors	assumed	the	risk	of	over-stocking	goods,	which	might	need	to	be	sold	in	a	glutted,	post-war	market,	and
the	tasks	of	assembling	an	infrastructure	of	agents,	negotiating	transport,	and	dealing	with	supply	chains.	All	these
risk-laden	operations	were	detailed	within	contracts,	most	often	on	highly	advantageous,	risk-averse	terms	for
government.
For	contractors,	the	prospect	of	profitability	was	inevitably	attractive,	and	essential	compensation,	if	men	were	to	risk
capital	and	reputation.	Trust	was	crucial	not	only	for	government	in	awarding	contracts	where	creditworthiness,
ability,	and	respectability	were	key	elements,	but	also	permeated	different	sets	of	relationships	between	partners,
suppliers,	and	agents.	Contractors	used	product	knowledge,	access	to	capital	and	credit,	market	intelligence,
personal	and	professional	networks,	and	an	impressively	high	degree	of	connectivity	across	sectors,	to	overcome
problems	of	risk,	scale,	and	cost.	To	achieve	these	objectives,	it	is	unsurprising	to	find	partnerships	were	common,
and	especially	suitable	for	merchants	trading	to	specific	parts	of	the	world,	or	for	particular	ethnic	and	national
groups,	such	as	Scots	and	Sephardic	Jews,	who	were	influential	groups	throughout	the	eighteenth	century.
The	range	of	people	and	occupations	involved	in	contracting	encompassed	craftsmen,	provision	merchants,	farmers,
farriers,	coopers,	millers,	and	bakers,	to	name	only	a	few—a	range	clearly	indicative	of	a	complex,	stratified,	and
inter-related	economy.	Horse-dealers	are	a	case	in	point.	Contracts	for	horses	were	made	with	a	distinct	community
of	London	horse-dealers;	for	those	outside	the	trade,	procurement	could	be	problematic.	Among	horse-dealers,
partnerships	and	sub-contracting	was	often	necessary	to	meet	heightened	demands.	Several	worked	in	multiple
capacities	in	horse-racing,	horse-breeding,	inn-keeping,	running	mail-coaches,	and	additionally	supplying
encampments	with	wagons,	forage,	and	bread.
Sub-contracting	was	integral	to	all	contracts,	and	acknowledgment	of	this	often-shadowy	world	indicates	that
contracting	encompassed	a	huge	range	of	services.	Unfortunately	for	historians,	it	seems	likely	many	agreements
were	verbal,	informal,	or	unorthodox,	and	therefore	unrecorded,	but	sufficient	evidence	exists	to	illustrate	the
complexity	of	contracting,	for	behind	simple	agreements	between	government	and	named	individuals	there	existed	a
host	of	agents,	assistants,	suppliers,	and	labourers.
Out-sourcing	supply	always	raised	the	risk	of	fraud	and	corruption,	and	there	was	a	long	tradition	of	hostility	to	the
‘monied	interest’	as	‘tax-eaters’	and	rapacious	beneficiaries	of	a	bloated	state	apparatus.	Combined	with	absurd	pre-
Weberian	bureaucratic	practices	and	the	survival	of	antiquated	medieval	offices	as	a	vehicle	for	patronage,	it	was
easy	to	view	contractors	as	part	of	a	parasitic	political	system	of	‘Old	Corruption’	based	on	self-interest	and	personal
gain.	Yet	in	assuming	risk,	using	market	intelligence	and	expertise,	and	organizing	supply	on	a	vast	scale,
contractors	acted	as	quintessential	eighteenth-century	capitalists.	This	much	is	clear	from	extensive	sub-contracting
which	was	very	much	the	‘hidden	wiring’	in	contract	performance.
Ultimately,	the	endurance	and	strength	of	the	‘contractor	state’	rested	on	its	responsiveness	to	the	unpredictability
and	unforeseen	demands	of	wartime.	The	expertise	the	British	state	harnessed	was	indicative	of	a	vibrant	highly-
productive	agricultural	sector	and	a	labour-intensive	proto-industrial	sector.	Modest	improvements	in	production	and
technological	progress	facilitated	efficient	supply	methods.	Yet,	human	agency	was	perhaps	most	vital	of	all,	for	only
expertise	in	coordination,	planning	and	distribution,	could	make	the	different	elements	work	together.
The	named	contractor	was	coordinator,	facilitator,	and	middleman,	but	the	largely	hidden	world	of	sub-contracting
reveals	that	behind	every	contract	were	a	myriad	of	people,	trades,	processes,	and	techniques.	While	contracts	were
often	lucrative	and	a	means	of	advancement,	they	were	not	sinecures,	but	specialized	work	based	on	knowledge	and
experience.	From	the	vantage-point	of	the	twenty-first	century,	the	eighteenth-century	supply	system	was
characterised	by	an	intelligent	use	of	available	resources,	and	was	innovative	in	its	rigorous	and	rational	approach	to
resource	allocation	and	distribution.
♣♣♣
Notes:
This	blog	post	is	based	on	the	authors’	paper	The	impact	of	war:	New	business	networks	and	small-scale
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